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THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BILL
0. R. McGumE*
Chairman,Special Committee on Administrative Law,
American Bar Association
The House of Delegates and the Board of Governors of the
American Bar Association in their recent meeting (January 7-10,
1939, Chicago, Ill.) approved, with an amendment, the draft of an
administrative law bill submitted by their Committee on Administrative Law after some six years of study. They directed the
Committee to take such action as might be necessary to have the
draft bill enacted into law. Mr. Harold J. Laski, noted English
author, lecturer, and professor at the London School of Economics, advised the writer that the approval by the American Bar
Association of such a bill was at least fifty years in advance of
what he would expect of that organization. In taking such action
the Association disproved, in effect, a suggestion of Mr. Thurman
Arnold (now Assistant Attorney General of the United States)
made at a symposium on administrative law held some two years
ago by the Georgetown University Law Alumni, that the American
Bar Association was incapable of drafting and agreeing upon any
bill which, if enacted into law, would codify and simplify the administrative determination of controversies with the United States
with adequate, but not ham-stringing, judicial reviews of such administrative decisions.
As the present chairman of the Committee and its chairman
in 1935-1936 and 1936-1937-and the only member whose service
has been continuous since its organization in 1933-I know that I
speak for the members of the Committee when I state that we are
pleased that the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates
have been able to approve the result of our more than six years of
study. Also, it is encouraging that the draft of the bill has been
subjected to close scrutiny by teachers of administrative law in
* A.B., A.M., LL.B., S.J.D., LL.D., Chairman, Committee on Administrative
Law, The Virginia State Bar Association; member of the Executive Council
and of the Committee on Administrative Law, Federal Bar Association. Sometime Special Assistant to various Attorneys General of the United States and
Counsel to the Comptroller General of the United States.
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the various law schools, by members of the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals, by government administrators, and by experienced practitioners before various governmental agencies-with
comparatively few suggestions to the Committee as to changes
and amendments thereof.
No doubt the reasons for this are at least two-fold: (1) the
procedure followed in evolving the draft; and (2) the character
and experience of the members of the Committee.
As to the procedure in evolving the draft, it should be stated
that, commencing in the autumn of 1936, successive drafts based
on intensive studies from 1933 to 1936 were prepared and sent to
every teacher of administrative law in the approved law schools
and to every lawyer throughout the United States who was believed to be informed and interested in the subject. Their studies
and criticisms of the bill were requested. Moreover, appeals for
studies, criticisms, and suggestions of the bar generally were published in the Journal of the American Bar Association, the Journal
of the American Judicature Society, and the Journal of the Federal Bar Association. Specific requests were addressed to all the
judges of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. The responses were carefully studied and such of the suggestions as
were believed to have merit were worked into the final draft of
the bill submitted at Chicago.
In addition, the Committee had the invaluable aid of Roscoe
Pound, former Dean of the Harvard Law School, as chairman in
1937-1938, and he has continued his interest in the program subsequent to the Cleveland meeting (1938) of the Association, though
other pressing duties required him to surrender the active direction of the work of the Committee. Also, the Committee had the
benefit of the advice and services of James R. Garfield of Cleveland, who had been Commissioner of the Bureau of Corporations
(predecessor of the present Federal Trade Commission) and Secretary of the Interior. In the absence of Dean Pound on a lecture
tour in South America, Mr. Garfield presented the report of the
Committee at the Cleveland Convention and his remarks there
will repay reading by all serious students of government in action.
Professor Felix Frankfurter, now Mr. Justice Frankfurter of
the Supreme Court of the United States, was a member of the
Committee for approximately one year and a half. During a part
of this time he was absent in England as a visiting professor at
Oxford and his substitute was Mr. John Dickinson, then assistant
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Secretary of Commerce and later assistant Attorney General of
the United States. Mr. Dickinson is a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania and is now general solicitor of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Also, Mr. Charles B. Rugg of Boston, formerly
assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of defense of suits against the Federal government in the Court of
Claims and the United District Courts, served as a member of the
Committee. Professor Milton Handler of the Columbia University
Law School; Walter F. Dodd, formerly professor of law at Yale
University and now engaged in the private practice of law in
Chicago; Julius C. Smith of Greensboro, North Carolina, who is
general counsel of a large life insurance company; Louis G. Caldwell, formerly general counsel of the Federal Radio Commission,
and now a member of a large Chicago law firm; Robert F. Maguire, formerly an employee of the Coast and Geodetic Survey as
well as of the Department of the Interior, and a former president
of the Oregon State Bar; and many others, have rendered yeoman
service in the study of this problem and in the formulation of the
successive drafts of the bill which resulted in the final draft submitted in Chicago.
Thus Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals,
have participated in the work of the Committee. Except on the
part of two of the several members of the Committee, there has
been no substantial disagreement among the various members of
the Committee since it was organized in 1933. The draft finally
formulated and approved is in no sense New Deal or anti-New
Deal and any attempt to make it so appear comes from the efforts
of special pleaders to draw a red herring across the trail of any
reform. The draft represents an earnest attempt to meet the pressing problems of governmental administration so as not to hamper
the execution of the laws while, at the same time, providing those
guarantees necessary to insure that the administrative agencies
shall themselves be regulated; that is, that they remain within the
standards or canals fixed by the Constitution and the statutes in
conformity therewith. This was no easy task. As James Madison,
the Father of the Constitution, said:
"You must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself."
As might be expected from the background of private and
public service rendered by the men I have mentioned as having
been members of the Committee on Administrative Law, none
was a starry-eyed theorist. Each one realized, to paraphrase a
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famous English statesman, that the United States is not governed
by logic but is governed by laws enacted by Congress. Each of
these men was, and is, a thorough student of Anglo-American
legal history and none was willing to sacrifice upon the altars of
theory or alleged efficiency, the liberties of the citizen.
Some modern disciples of Karl Marx, exponents, as Dean
Pound has stated, of "administrative absolutism" and doctrines of
"psychological determinism" may sneer that the Constitution of
the United States is outmoded and unequal to present-day problems of government-while they greedily accept the advantages
of that Constitution. This doctrine of administrative absolutism
is nothing more or less than the proposition that either there
should be no judicial review or, at the most, a minimum of judicial review of administrative action, whether that action be legislative or judicial in character. Their theory seems to be that the
processes of the courts are too slow to meet the ever changing and
shifting economic and social problems; that the judges, appointed
for political reasons, are unfamiliar with these problems and are
not qualified to determine them; and, finally, that the administrative officers, being experts, know best what should be done and
should not be subject to judicial control or restraint. It ignores the
fact that too frequently such officers are ex-officio experts only.
This theory of psychological determinism posits that the judicial
process is shaped wholly and inexorably by the psychological determinants of the individual judge, which determinants are largely
undiscoverable and that judicial action is only in pretense and
appearance uniform and predictable. The Marxian theories were
held by Pushakanis, law writer of Soviet Russia, and when they
failed under the test of practice he had to face a firing squad.
At no time has any member of the Committee on Administrative Law suggested that the Committee should accept any such
views. The conservative members of the Committee would have
nothing whatever to do with any such theories and the liberal
members were too wise in the ways of government, as practiced
since recorded history, to trust their liberality to administrative
absolutism or psychological determinism. These men knew that
trust placed in men to administer law in their uncontrolled discretion was similar to placing trust in a broken reed, as Pushakanis
learned too late. Further, not one of the several members of the
Committee was willing to turn his back on the Constitution of the
United States and Anglo-American legal history from the days of
the Stuart kings to the present.
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On the other hand, the Committee could not accept the view
of a small minority that, as soon as a controversy arises with some
administrative officer or tribunal of the federal government, the
private individual should be required to file a bill of complaint or
other appropriate pleading in a federal district court where the
claim or other controversy would have to be tried de novo on the
law and the facts. Among the reasons for the inability of the
Committee to sponsor any such program may be mentioned the
following: (1) The vast volume of controversies with the United
States would swamp any judicial system unless there is a preliminary weeding-out process. For instance, the official records
show that one of the larger departments of the federal government heard and determined more than four times as many cases
as all of the federal courts combined during a corresponding period, and another department had approximately three times as
many intra-departmental appeals as were filed in all of the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals during a corresponding period.
(2) The pleadings and other processes of the trial courts are not
geared to the necessary expedition in the handling of administrative controversies with the United States. The administration of
the law can not be halted for a year or two while a test case is
dragging its weary way through the traditional courts in accordance with the traditional procedure. (3) The local United States
District Attorneys and their assistants-appointed and holding
office for short periods of time-generally are not familiar enough
with the varied and sundry problems of governmental administration to defend successfully the United States in the many district
courts throughout the country. This would necessitate a large
increase in trial attorneys attached to the various agencies of government and a large increase in appropriations for their salaries
and expenses in traveling from the seat of government to the
various districts either to try the cases or to assist the United
States Attorneys in doing so. (4) Also, it is doubtful for constitutional reasons whether the constitutional courts could be vested
with the necessary jurisdiction to determine de novo all classes
of controversies with the United States.
The 1936 Committee, under chairmanship of the writer, did
consider the advisability of establishing a large court at the seat
of government, with trial and appellate divisions, to hear and
determine on the law and the facts many classes of administrative
controversies. It was thought that daily consideration of these
problems of government would make the court more familiar
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with them than any of the traditional courts could become, and
that since the court would be legislative in character there could
be avoided the constitutional questions as to its jurisdiction in
certain classes of cases. This plan involved the consolidation of
the three existing legislative courts and the Board of Tax Appeals
with the addition of sufficient judges to constitute a court of forty.
It was, however, severally criticized by various elements of the
bar and the government-as the writer had warned the Committee would be the result.
No concrete recommendations were made by the Committee
prior to 1936 regarding the establishment of an administrative
court or the reform of existing procedures so as to utilize more
fully the administrative agencies of the federal government, with
resort in the final instance to the traditional courts for review of
the administrative action in either or both legislative and judicial
exercise of governmental power. With the reorganization of the
Committee after the Boston Convention of the American Bar
Association, we agreed early in the autumn of 1936 to abandon the
administrative court idea and strike at the root of the troublethe administrative process. The 1937 report of the Committee to
the Kansas City Convention of the Association carried out this
agreement and the draft of an administrative law bill was printed
as an appendix to the report. It was believed that this measure
would carry out the thought expressed by Elihu Root in his 1916
presidential address to the American Bar Association; that is, a
bill which would permit the administrative agencies to function
freely and fully so. long as they functioned fairly and in good
faith, and in accordance with the terms of the Constitution and
statutes. The 1938 report of the Committee, under the chairmanship of Dean Pound, to the Cleveland Convention of the Association elaborated upon the reasons for this proposed solution of the
problem and there was printed as an appendix to that report a
revision of the 1937 draft which had been approved by the Board
of Governors. The House of Delegates recommitted the bill to
the Committee with the requirement that the draft be resubmitted to both the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates
and that they approve the same both as to form and substance.
The draft was revised to some extent and submitted with a
report to the Chicago meeting of the House and Board, where the
draft was amended to a slight extent and approved by both bodies
as the American Bar Association Administrative Law Bill. The
report and bill have been reprinted in the February 1939 number
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of the Journal of the American Bar Association but, for lack of
space, there was not reprinted after each section of the bill the
annotations showing in detail some of the reasons therefor. In
other words, the proposed bill and report are now available for
the study of all interested lawyers and business men as well as
organized labor. The bill has been introduced in the United States
Senate where it is known as S-915 and the matter is before the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. In addition,
copies of the annotated draft of the bill have been sent to every
State and City Bar Association having representation in the House
of Delegates with the request that the necessary action be taken
fully to inform all members of their associations with respect
thereto. Our draft of the bill, S-915, should not be confused with
S-916 introduced the same day by Senator M. M. Logan of Kentucky to which the lawyers of the American Bar Association are
opposed for various reasons. It would take me too far aside from
my subject to attempt to state these reasons at this time but the
gist thereof will be found in the tesimony of Dean Pound, Mr.
Robert F. Maguire, Mr. Appel and the writer before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary of the 75th Congress in the hearings
on S-3676.
In substance, our bill makes no attempt to reshuffle the practical distribution of legislative, executive and judicial power, as that
distribution has been made from time to time across the century
and a half of our national existence so as to meet the ever-present
but constantly changing problems of government.
While the Constitution divided the general powers of government among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, it
did not purport to make any absolute division of all such powers
and it was recognized by the authors of the federalist papers that
it did not do so. The First Congress recognized that the administrative officers could best issue rules and regulations, or subordinate legislation, to fill in minor details for the administration of
the departments of government created by that Congress, and the
practice has been a more or less continuous one to this day.
Neither that Congress nor any succeeding Congress has attempted
to prescribe the detailed procedure of pleading and practice in the
courts or all the rules of decision which should be applied by the
judicial branch in the determination of concrete cases. The Constitution had seen fit to confer on the judicial branch jurisdiction
of all cases in law, admiralty and equity but it left to the Congresses from time to time to work out the details. In the statutes,
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the Congresses have worked out the jurisdiction which the inferior federal courts should exercise but, with minor exceptions,
the legislative branch has very wisely and properly left details to
the judiciary. There appears no reason why a similar procedure
should not be followed as to the executive branch in the administration of the statutes.
It is even more important today that the statutes mark out the
channel and prescribe the standards in legislation dealing with
social and economic problems. These problems are constantly
changing and necessitating changes in details of administration
in order to cope with them. Congress is not constantly in session;
its members can not foresee all the changes which may take place
when they draft legislation; and these members of Congress,
drawn for short periods of time from civil life, can not possibly
study all of the vast and sundry details which must be observed
and changed from time to time in our complex economy. Therefore, it is in the interest of both wisdom and flexibility to leave to
the administrative officers immediately concerned in the execution of the statutes the necessary authority and jurisdiction to
issue sub-legislation, or rules and regulations within well-defined
channels and subject to standards stated in the statutes. The exercise of such power by administrative officers is in no sense of the
word a surrender to them of the functions and duties of the legislative branch of the government, though it is necessarily true that
today the scope and extent of the exercise of such power by administrative officers is far greater than it was at any time prior to
the World War.
But this is far from suggesting that the administrative officers
may be permitted to issue such rules and regulations when they
see fit; that they may or may not give public notice and hold public hearings, when demanded, before such rules and regulations
are issued; and that the individual must be harassed by any rule
or regulation unless and until such individual is, perchance, able
to raise the question of its validity in a suit brought against him
or which he may bring against the United States. The President's
Committee on Administrative Management is on record as recommending that public notice and public hearing should be required
before administrative officers exercise legislative power and that
there should be some expeditious and inexpensive method of
testing the validity of the regulations thereafter issued.
Contrary to this recommendation by the President's Committee, some of his subordinates have claimed that any such require-
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ment would "ham-string" administration of the laws and would
place "business in a strait-jacket" through hasty and ill-considered rules and regulations. The position of these subordinates
emphasizes the correctness of both the President's Committee and
of our Committee that due to the vast proportions of the administrative establishment-consisting of some 130-odd different agencies and about 850,000 civil officers and employees as well as a
third more in the uniform services-the Chief Executive is unable
-toretain control over all of his subordinates and has no means of
knowing whether, through them, he is taking care that the laws
be faithfully executed. Moreover, there is nothing whatever in
the argument that by such a device business would be placed in
a strait-jacket, as the rules and regulations could be changed and
amended at any time-but only after public notice and a public
hearing if such should be requested, and subject to judicial review
as to whether the statute and rule are in accordance with the Constitution and whether the rule is in accordance with the statute.
Further, subordinate officers and employees of administrative
agencies must have directives as to how their duties are to be
discharged in the administration of particular statutes. The subordinates must function at once and more or less continuously in
applying the terms of the statutes to particular sets of facts as
they arise in the administration of the law. Yet it has been admitted that years have elapsed before some administrative agencies
have issued any rules and it is seriously claimed that sometimes
years are required before a rule can be formulated. This is equivalent to the statement that during this long period of time the
subordinate administrative officer is either proceeding as his own
knowledge may dictate in the enforcement of the statute (regardless of what his fellow employees may be doing), or is appealing
to his superior officer-in person, by telegram or by letter-for
instructions in each instance. The former state of affairs leads
to contradictions and uncertainty with resulting dissatisfaction,
while the latter results in a state of affairs in which the rules of
the game are known to the government officer but not to the individual citizen, and where rules may be applied, or even changed,
as the game progresses without any regard whatever for past action in similar cases. This is certainly an unhealthy and inefficient
manner to administer the statutes of the United States. It is exactly the situation which obtained in the absolute governments of
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the ancient world and which today obtains in the countries ruled
by dictators.
Furthermore, to attempt by judicial action to establish rules
from the cases as they arise and are contested, results in a delay of
years for the interpretation of a complex statute. Also, in litigation between the United States and a private party, the lawmaking function is distracted by factors which are important in
that particular case but irrelevant to the formulation of future
policy.
Having all of these matters in mind, the Committee on Administrative Law recommended in sections 1 and 2 of the billand the Board of Governors and House of Delegates approved-a
requirement that, except in an emergency, rules must be issued
under all statutes enacted after the bill becomes law so as to
implement the terms of such statutes, but only after public notice
and a public hearing if a hearing should be requested. As to prior
statutes, the existing rules must be reconsidered after public notice and public hearing, if requested. While all rules must be issued
in the first instance within ninety days from the date that a statute becomes law, they may be amended, rescinded or supplemented at any time thereafter following public notice and public
hearing, when requested.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (a court having certain common law and statutory jurisdiction
as a District of Columbia Court and all the jurisdiction of a United
States Circuit Court of Appeals) is given jurisdiction to determine,
upon the petition of any interested party, whether the rule is constitutional, and if so, whether the rule is in accordance with the
terms of the statute or statutes under which it was issued. Any
such determination by this court may not foreclose the raising of
the issue in the merits of any controversy in some other court.J
Both the rule and the notice of any judicial determination of
its validity must be published in the Federal Register and the rule
has no effect until it is published. An individual acting in good
faith in accordance with the rule is protected for a period of thirty
days after notice of its rescission or its invalidity is published in
the Federal Register.
As a matter of practical procedure, some of the agencies of
1. This procedure is a common one in a number of states. See Andrews,
Administrative Labor Legislation (1936).
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government now hold public hearings preliminary to the issuance
of rules while a few others are required by recent statutes to do
so.2 These statutes were enacted subsequent to the publication of
the 1937 report of the Committee on Administrative Law. The
procedure to date has belied all suggestions that section 2 of the
bill for judicial review of the rules would swamp the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. As a matter
of fact, it is fairly expensive to employ a lawyer and pay the costs
of testing out such a rule. It is not expected that any such tests
will be made except by business and labor organizations vitally
interested in some social or economic legislation and the rules
thereunder. All of these principal organizations have representation in Washington and as the public necessities require prompt
action in this respect, it was not thought desirable, at this stage
of development of administrative law, that the jurisdiction be
shared by other Circuit Courts of Appeals outside of the District
of Columbia.
The draft bill authorizes and requests the Supreme Court of
the United States to issue "uniform rules of practice and procedure for the hearing of all claims and controversies between the
United States or its governmental agencies and any person, of
which such agencies are vested with power and jurisdiction to
hear and determine." This requirement will result in uniform
rules for the administrative hearing of concrete cases and controversies and uniform rules for judicial reviews thereof.
Sections 3 and 4 of the draft concern the semi-judicial work
connected with the administration of the law and with judicial
reviews thereof in the traditional courts of appeal, these sections
being complementary to the same extent as sections 1 and 2 complement each other as to the exercise of quasi-legislative power
in the administration of the statutes.
Neither section 3 nor section 4 contemplates any great change
in the existing administrative procedure. The multiple-headed
so-called independent boards, commissions and authorities, as
such, seldom hear the evidence in controversies which they must
determine. The procedure is by no means uniform. In some instances a commissioner or board member may hear the evidence
and in other instances employees may be assigned as trial examiners to such tasks. In the latter event, the examiner is supposed,
in most instances, to present to the tribunal the record accompan2. See Conner, Legislative Function of National Administrative Authorities (1927) 170-270.
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ied by his report which is in the nature of tentative findings of
facts and a decision or order. These papers may or may not be
furnished to the private party. If a hearing is demanded, the case
is briefed and there may be oral arguments. Such procedure is a
necessity in a number of instances, such as the Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, and others where
there is a large volume of work. Section 3 of the draft would
establish a uniform procedure for these multiple-headed agencies
to insure a full and fair hearing of the claim or controversy.
The situation is more complicated in the single-headed agencies of the administrative service. In a comparatively few instances, statutes have created boards within such agencies to hear
and determine certain classes of claims and controversies. In
others, such boards have been created by administrative rule, and
in the balance of the agencies, employees make determinations for
the approval of the head of the agency, or such representative as
may be designated to make the approvals or disapprovals. It is
physically impossible for the heads of larger agencies of government, such as the Department of Agriculture or the Treasury
Department or the Veterans' Administration, for instance, to personally consider more than a small fraction of the claims and controversies which arise in the administration of various and sundry
statutes required to be administered by their respective agencies.
However, the boards created by rule in these agencies have no
jurisdiction to subpoena witnesses or to build a fair and impartial
record which might be used as the basis of a judicial review, and
the same situation obtains where some officer or employee prepares the tentative decision. In some, but not in all cases, the
aggrieved individual or his attorney may be permitted to informally discuss the claim or controversy with the board created by
rule or with the individual employee and a written statement may
be submitted. However, the individual has little or no means of
showing errors in any ex parte report of the facts made by the
officer or employee actually administering the statute, and in most
instances the individual or his attorney is not permitted to see
such report. This is not only seriously disadvantageous to the private party but it is equally so to the conscientious public official
whose sole concern is that the claims and controversies arising in
his agency shall be settled and adjusted in accordance with the
law and the facts.
In recognition of this entire condition of affairs, the proposed
bill provides for the creation within the agency from time to time
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as the needs thereof may require, of such number of three member
intra-agency boards as may be necessary, with the requirement
that at least the chairman of each board shall be a lawyer. The
draft, of course, would recognize the boards which may already
exist in some of the agencies, whether by virtue of statutes or by
virtue of rules, but provides that all such boards shall be reorganized with three members each, at least the chairman in each instance to be a lawyer. As there may be from one to a dozen or
more such boards functioning at the same time in some of the
larger agencies, the draft requires that the findings of facts and
decision or order of all boards must be reduced to writing and
approved, disapproved, or modified in writing by the head of the
agency or his designated representative. Such authority in the
head of the agency is necessary in order that conflicts among the
several boards may be avoided, since it is not intended that the
United States shall be permitted to appeal from the final conclusions of these agencies.
No one but a theorist-whose knowledge of administrative
law is limited to its pathological aspects as gleaned from court
decisions-would for a moment think that the head of any agency
of the federal government could find either the time or the energy
to be familiar with every controversy which may arise through
the administration of statutes by his subordinates located at many
places throughout the country. The head of an agency can not be
familiar with more than a mere fraction of the controversies arising under his agency and then only when they reach such an
acute stage that his personal attention must be claimed with respect thereto. The vast amount of law administration must be
performed by subordinates, many stages removed from the chief
officer or officers of the particular administrative agency. The
United States does not pay sufficient salaries to obtain in all cases
broad-gauged men and women for these subordinate places and
we have no Civil Service or career service worthy of the name for
employees in these more responsible positions. England is far
ahead of our country in providing a real career service with sufficient rewards in both honors and salaries to secure the honor men
from her leading universities and to retain them in the service
until death or retirement. In the United States all principal offices are filled by virtue of political services to the party in power
and it is a naive person, indeed, who would expect a politician
appointed to office to cease to be a politician when retention in
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the service depends to a considerable extent upon his remaining a
politician.
The result of all this is at least two-fold, and it may be threefold in the administration of the law. There is incompetency and
favoritism on the part of some subordinate administrative officers
holding the more important positions as the result of political
patronage. There is, or there may be, political or class pressure
exerted on, or bias shown by, some of these employees. Few men
big enough to head a governmental agency want any such practices on the part of their subordinates; very naturally the presumption is that the subordinate is a faithful, competent and just
employee. The burden of proof to establish the contrary is-and
rightly should be-on the private individual but no procedure has
been established whereby that burden may be carried, except in
a limited class of cases where wrong, fraud or injustice may be
shown in the courts. Quite naturally, business men and their lawyers hesitate to attack a government employee and this too is as it
should be, but our administrative procedure should be such that
these defects in a subordinate may be made of record and necessarily appear upon the face of that record.
The intra-agency board is a device which will accomplish that
purpose. Under the terms of the proposed bill, the aggrieved
party would have the right to require his witnesses to be summoned and all necessary documents or objects subpoenaed and he
not only would have the right to publicly place the testimony of
his witnesses and the documents in the record, but he would have
the right to publicly cross-examine the witnesses of the government, including the officer or employee whose acts caused the
claim or controversy to be brought before the board. Further, the
head of the agency or his principal subordinates would have a
check on the board, through their power to approve or disapprove
or modify the findings of facts and the decision or order of that
board. As the findings of facts and the decision or order of both
the board and the head of the agency or his principal subordinates
are required to constitute a part of the record, the courts would
have this before them in the event of appeal. Arbitrary and incompetent administrative action simply could not thrive in such
an atmosphere. It is only when men and women are given responsibility and made publicly answerable for the exercise of it that
we may expect any substantial improvement in the administration of the law. Where matters are determined by unknown and
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unnamed individuals, with some superior officer being required to
assume responsibility therefor, at least in name, there thrives the
old game of "passing the buck."
However, aside from this phase of the matter, appeals now are
generally prosecuted to some superior officer and in many cases
he is able to adjust the controversy. If he is unable to make an
adjustment, there should be no need to assemble all of the evidence again and go to the expense of placing it in a court record.
The short and simple procedure is to take the record, properly
made before the administrative agency, to a court so that the
court may review it. This would not only save expenses but would
also save a great deal of time. By the terms of the proposed bill,
such a review is contemplated in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or in the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the aggrieved person resides or has his principal place of business or in which the controversy arose. Where the claim or controversy is otherwise within
the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Claims, provision is
made in the bill that the review may be secured in that court if
the individual so elects.
One uniform procedure of review is contemplated for all administrative decisions in the exercise of quasi-judicial power,
whether such decisions or orders be made by an intra-agency
board or by a so-called independent board. This will save much
time in the writing of opinions-since the judges will not be required to consult the statutes in every cited case arising under the
laws administered by other agencies to see whether the case is
actually in point on procedural matters. Only those who have
been required to undergo such drudgery are able to appreciate
the vast amount of work thereby involved.
Obviously, the scope of review in the courts is very important.
The Committee proceeded on the theory that this scope of review
should be broader than on an appeal from a jury verdict and
broader than exists where the matter is tried before a court without a jury. The jury and the trial judge hearing the evidence are
supposed to be, and generally are, unbiased while it is not always
true that a board of government officers or employees hearing a
case or controversy is unbiased. On the other hand, the Committee
concluded that there was no necessity-and that it was impracticable-to impose on the reviewing courts the mandatory duty of
reviewing the evidence in all cases to see whether the findings of
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facts were clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence and whether there had been a full and fair hearing as contemplated by the bill. On the contrary, if the reviewing court
was given discretionary jurisdiction to review the evidencewhen counsel for the individual could show that the findings of
facts were clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence-and if the trial board knew in advance that such jurisdiction did exist, there would be relatively few occasions when it
would be necessary for the courts to actually exercise such jurisdiction to review the evidence. In brief, the judicial review formula stated in section 4 of the draft was worked out upon the
basis of the decided cases and with a view to accomplish the purpose of requiring a full and fair hearing by the administrative
agency-with sufficient jurisdiction in the reviewing court to see
that substantial justice was done in each case in accordance with
the law and the record evidence.
The Committee has had some difficulty in getting both government employees and lawyers in private practice to understand
that section 3 of the draft aplied to the actual administration of
the statutes; that is, that this section intended to provide the machinery by which a public record could be publicly built before
trained employees and for the consideration of the head of the
agency or his designated representative so that the great bulk of
administrative controversies could be satisfactorily adjusted. Having built such a record for the administrative adjudication of the
controversy, there is no need to rebuild another record before a
trial court with all the delay and expense to both the private
party and the taxpayers which such a procedure would entail.
Accordingly, as above stated, section 4 of the draft provides that
the review of the case on the record built before the administrative agency shall be in the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals
or in the Court of Claims, if the matter is otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the latter court.
Opponents of the plan have argued that reviews of the rules
(as contemplated by section 2 of the draft) in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and reviews of the
decisions or orders of the boards (as contemplated by section 4)
in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, including the one
in the District of Columbia, would swamp the courts-but they
present no statistics or reasons to support such an argument. The
Committee confidently believes that even with the increased number of controversies which could be reviewed by the courts, the
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actual number which will be taken to the courts will be decreased. In other words, there are a great many classes of cases
arising under various statutes which may now be taken to the
courts, but in most instances the scope of review in the courts
varies from statute to statute and in relatively few instances do
the statutes provide any requirements as to the form of the administrative hearings. There is not only room for differences of
opinion as between the courts and the administrative agencies as
to the procedure which should be followed but in actual fact there
are many such differences. All this is unnecessary and is a waste
of money and effort on the part of both the individual and the
federal government. Further it is most difficult for administrative
agencies to function and for the individual to know what to do
under particular statutes where there exists such uncertainty in
procedural matters.
Some administrative agencies object to that feature of the bill
which concentrates in the Department of Justice the supervision
of all judicial reviews of administrative rules and administrative
decisions. The officials of some of such administrative agencies
have publicly stated that there may not always be an agreement
between them and the Department of Justice as to the proper
interpretation of a statute. Of course, this is very true, but after
all the Attorney General of the United States is the chief legal
officer of the federal government and, if it is believed that his
opinion of a statute is in error, the place to have the error corrected is in the Congress through a change in the statute. The individual should not be saddled with the expense and effort of
taking the controversy through the courts to see whether the Department of Justice or the particular agency may be correct as to
their respective and conflicting interpretations of the statute.
Then, again, the Department of Justice is not an administrative
agency in the same sense as the Department of Agriculture, the
Federal Trade Commission, or the Securities and Exchange Commission which are agencies engaged in the administration of
various statutes. Not infrequently these law administering agencies take an extreme position. They would not be good administrators unless they attempted to carry out the statutes to their
fullest extent. On the other hand, the Department of Justice
takes a more detached view of the statutes and, with sufficient
jurisdiction to do so, could avoid judicial reviews which might
otherwise be necessary if the administrative agency concerned
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had the authority and responsibility to defend the statutes in the
courts.
It has been urged by some administrative officers and by
some lawyers that instead of intra-agency boards to hear and determine administrative appeals, there should be created a series of
so-called independent boards sufficient in number to do this work.
These men assert that such intra-agency boards will be dominated
by politics and by the head of the agency who must be something of a politician before he may secure that position. Men who
should know better point to the failure of a few intra-agency
boards of the past-but these boards had no authority to summon
witnesses and there was no jurisdiction in the courts to review
their decisions.
An answer to these arguments is that the single-headed administrative agencies are today, and every day except Sundays
and holidays, actually administering the law and are actually deciding claims and controversies as they arise from day to day and
hour to hour. They are, for the most part, doing their best to arrive at correct results with little or no adequate authority to
determine the actual facts. They must rely upon ex parte statements of subordinates whose actions in many instances gave rise
to the controversy and most of whom report such facts as will
serve to justify them with their superior officers. I do not mean
to suggest that there are many instances where the subordinate
deliberately colors the facts to suit his own ends, but I do mean to
say that it requires a very capable and detached individual to see
and report facts adverse to the position which he may have taken.
Without authority to summon witnesses and to hear their examination and cross-examination, the responsible administrative official must rely upon these ex parte statements, except in the more
important controversies where an independent investigation may
be made. Also, the attorney for the individual generally does not
know the contents of the adverse reports and is therefore unable
to show the errors therein.
The situation is not so bad with the independent boards and
commissions. They are generally equipped with authority to summon witnesses and hear their examination and cross-examination
-though, as in the case of the Packers and Stockyards Act administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, there has been no
attempt in the statute to prescribe the procedure for a full and
fair hearing, and the Supreme Court of the United States does not
have the authority to issue unifbrm rules of procedure for the
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actual hearing of the controversy which it would have under the
proposed draft.
It would seem that no informed person could deny to the administrative agencies the necessary machinery and jurisdiction to
dispose of any particular controversy arising in the administration of statutes which can not be settled by negotiation. It would
seem to be self-evident that such machinery and jurisdiction
should exist for the proper administration of the law. If this be
conceded, then the question is whether the judicial review should
be of the record administratively made-with sufficient jurisdiction in the reviewing court to examine the record, when that is
shown to be necessary to correct injustice-or whether the judicial
determination should be de novo on a record built before the
court. The Committee firmly believes that the review should be
on the administrative record on the basis of the formula stated in
section 4 of the draft and that it is impracticable to obtain a trial
de novo of the vast number of administrative controversies which
are not settled as the result of negotiation; that such a trial is unnecessary in the great bulk of cases where the facts may be fully
and fairly established for the consideration of superior administrative officers or employees; and that without a direct judicial
review of the administrative record there can not be obtained the
necessary improvements in both administration and personnel.
Some of those who could have, but did not make any suggestions for improvement of the draft as it was brought to the form
in which approved at Chicago, have loudly insisted that there
should be a different type of procedure for each separate administrative agency or at least that the procedure could not be made
uniform. They suggest that the reformation take place piecemeal
-and if any such suggestions were adopted, no substantial reforms of a general character could be accomplished for many
years. As a matter of fact, they make no concrete suggestions as
to such reforms as they think should be effected, though practically all admit that some reforms are necessary and desirable. As
to their insistence that a different procedure be maintained for
each separate administrative agency, they are in the same position as the practitioners at early common law who insisted that
there should be a separate writ and procedure for each action.
It required but a phrase in the Constitution to confer on the federal courts jurisdiction in law, equity and admiralty and within
the past year the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted
uniform rules for both law and equity cases. Suppose it had been
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attempted to formulate and approve a separate set of rules for
each class of actions which may be brought in the federal courts?
And yet the various and sundry administrative agencies of
government are charged with the responsibility of administering
statutes dealing with a particular problem or a particular class of
problems. Procedure is basic and fundamental. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has said, some of the most precious values of civilization are procedural in their nature and there is no more necessity
for a separate type of procedure for each administrative agency
than there is need for a separate type of procedure for each class
of actions coming before the courts today. One is tempted to believe that the men who make these suggestions are opposed to
any change in the chaotic status quo no matter in what form that
change might be suggested.
Section 5 of the draft provides for the taxation of costs against
the losing party, whether the agency or the individual, and authorizes the reviewing court to impose damages when the review
is sought for purposes of delay. Also, section 6 retains existing
remedies for judicial reviews or trials de novo, where they exist.
This has been done out of an abundance of caution on the part of
some members of the Bar who think the existing remedies for
judicial action should be retained until the procedure contemplated by the bill has demonstrated its worth and soundness. This
section makes certain exemptions from the terms of the bill. The
reasons for each exemption have been explained in the annotated
copy which was submitted to the Board of Governors and to the
House of Delegates in Chicago; limitations of space do not permit
such a detailed explanation here. It is quite possible that some
of the exemptions may be omitted by the Congress before the bill
is enacted into law or that subsequent amendments to the statute
may eliminate some of the exemptions.
By way of summary, it may be stated that the draft is quite
simple in its basic principles which are three in number: (1) improvement of methods of formulating rules in the exercise of the
quasi-legislative function (including provisions for judicial review of the rules so formulated); (2) establishment of a system of
administrative review of controversies arising in the administration of the statutes and rules issued thereunder; and (3) provisions for judicial review of the decisions or orders of the intraagency boards-such reviews to be uniform for all administrative
agencies, including both the intra-agency and independent boards.
These three basic principles cover, generally, three consecutive
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stages in the administrative process-that is, the formulation of
rules, the administrative review of the application by subordinates of the statutes and rules to the facts in particular controversies, and, finally, judicial review of the administrative action
by a uniform procedure.
In this manner, we think that the government will be required to control itself, and the administrative officials of that
government will themselves be regulated.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BILL-S. 915, H.R. 4236
To provide for the more expeditious settlement of disputes with the United
States and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States in Congress assembled, that:
SECTION 1. Implementing administrative rules. (a) Hereafter all administrative rules and amendments or modifications thereof, or supplements thereto,
except those relating to hearing procedure, and all amendments or modifications or supplements of existing rules (which shall include regulations), implementing or filling in the details of any statute affecting the rights of persons or property shall be issued by the head of the agency (which as used
in this act shall mean departments and independent establishments) and by
each independent agency (which as used in this act shall include boards, commissions, authorities and other organizations) charged with the administration of the statute after publication of notice and public hearings; and all
such rules and amendments shall be published in the Federal Register within
ten days (Sundays and national holidays excluded) after the date of their
approval by the head of the agency or the independent agency concerned,
and shall not become effective until such publication, except in a public emergency stated in the rule approved by the President. Rules under all statutes
hereafter enacted, shall be issued as herein provided within ninety days after
the date same become law subject to the adoption thereafter of further rules
or amendment of rules, or rescission of rules from time to time as provided in
this Act.
(b) Any person affected by an administrative rule in force on the date of
the approval of this act may petition the head of the agency or the independent agency which administers any statute under which the rule was issued
for a reconsideration of any such rule; and the head of such agency or the
independent agency shall, after publication of notice and public hearing, determine whether such rule shall be continued in force, modified, or rescinded.
All amendments of such rules shall be in accordance with the procedure provided in subsection (a) of this Section and all action of the head of such
agency or the independent agency on such petitions and all new or amended
rules shall be published in the Federal Register as prescribed in said subsection (a) for the publication of rules and amendments.
(c) No person shall be penalized or subjected to any forfeiture or prosecuted for any act done or omitted to be done in good faith in conformity with
a rule or amendment which has been rescinded or declared invalid by any
final judgment entered as hereinafter provided, unless the act was done or
omitted to be done more than thirty days (Sundays and national holidays
excluded) after the publication In the Federal Register of the rescission or
final judicial determination of the invalidity of such rule.
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(d) The Supreme Court of the United States is authorized and requested
to prescribe uniform rules of practice and procedure for the hearing of all
claims and controversies between the United States or its governmental agencies and any person, of which said agencies are vested with power and jurisdiction to hear and determine.
SECTION 2. Judicial Review of Rules. In addition to the jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, that court shall have jurisdiction, upon petition filed in accordance
with its rules, within thirty days (Sundays and national holidays excluded)
from the date any administrative rule is published in the Federal Register, to
hear and determine whether any such rule issued or continued in force in
accordance with Section 1 of this Act is in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States or the statute under which issued. No rule shall be held
invalid except for violation of the Constitution or for conflict with a statute
or for lack of authority conferred upon the agency issuing it by the statute or
statutes pursuant to which it was issued or for failure to comply with Section
1 of this Act. A copy of the petition, and copies of all subsequent pleadings
shall be served upon the Attorney General of the United States who shall
conduct the defense of the rule. The court may refer such petition and any
reply thereto for the taking of such evidence as shall be material and relevant
thereto. The court shall give preference to such petitions and shall have no
power in the proceedings except to render a declaratory judgment holding
such rule legal and valid or holding it contrary to law and invalid. If the
rule is held contrary to law and invalid, the rule thereafter shall not have any
force or effect except to confer immunity as provided in Section 1 of this Act.
Nothing contained in this Section shall prevent the determination of the
validity or invalidity of any rule which may be involved in any suit or review
of an administrative decision or order in any court of the United States as
now or hereafter authorized by law.
SECTION 3. Statutory Approval and Authority for Administrative Boards
and Prescribingtheir Procedure. (a) Every head of an agency (as defined in
Section 1 of this Act) shall from time to time designate three employees of
his agency for such intra-agency boards (including the field service of such
agency) as may be necessary and desirable. Where there are intra-agency
boards existing on the date of approval of this Act, they shall be re-established and function in accordance with this Act. Wherever practicable, such
boards shall be designated in various sections of the United States. At least
one employee designated for each such board shall be a lawyer who shall
act as chairman of the board. When the members of any board are not
engaged in the hearing of administrative appeals as hereinafter provided,
such employees shall be assigned to other duties in the service of the agency
concerned. No member of a board who has participated in a particular case
or in the preparation, draft or approval of any rule shall sit in review or
appeal of the case or application of the rule. Each board shall be impartial,
free and independent in the hearing and determination of administrative
appeals.
(b) When any person (which term wherever used in this Act shall include
individuals, corporations, partnerships, or other organizations) is aggrieved
by a decision, act or failure to act (which shall include any regulatory order)
by any officer or employee of any agency, such person may notify the head
of the agency in writing of objections thereto, specifically tequesting that the
claim or controversy be referred to a board constituted as hereinbefore provided for hearing and determination. Such notice shall be given not more
than twenty days after the date of receipt of a registered letter notifying him
of the decision, act, or failure to act. Such written objections shall be referred
promptly to an intra-agency board for the agency concerned. At a time and
place to be designated and communicated to the aggrieved person, he shall
have an opportunity at an early day for a full and fair hearing before said
board, at which time there shall be introduced into the record the testimony
and any documents or objects relating to the administrative appeal before
said board. Any person having a substantial interest in the controversy shall
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have the right to intervene therein. A stenographer shall be assigned to the
hearings before the board to take and transcribe the testimony. All testimony, other evidence and all proceedings before the board shall be reduced to
a written record and filed in the agency concerned and a copy thereof shall
be furnished to the aggrieved person upon his written request therefor at a
charge not exceeding fifteen cents a folio. Within thirty days (Sundays and
national holidays excluded) after the day the evidence and arguments are
closed, the board shall make written findings of facts and separate decision
or order thereon, which shall be subject to the written approval, disapproval,
or modification of the head of the agency concerned or of such person as he
shall designate in writing to act for him. A copy of the findings of fact and
decision or order, showing the action if any, of the head of the agency concerned or his representative, shall be filed in the agency as a part of the
written record in the case and a copy shall be sent by registered mail to the
aggrieved person and to the intervenors if any. The United States shall take
such action as may now or hereafter be provided by law to enforce the decision or order of the agency unless there be pending judicial review thereof
as hereinafter provided.
(c) The chairman of any board, upon request of any party to the proceedings, shall require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of documents and all other objects before said board
without other showing than required by the rules in United States District
Courts for the issuance of subpoenas by such courts. Any witness subpoenaed
or whose deposition is taken shall receive the same fees and mileage as witnesses in courts of the United States, to be paid by the party at whose
instance the witness appears or deposition is taken. In the event of disobedience of a subpoena issued as herein provided, the chairman, or any party
to the proceedings may apply to any district court of the United States of
the jurisdiction in which the witness may be found for an order requiring
his attendance and testimony and the production of all documents and objects
described in the subpoena. The chairman of the board shall be authorized to
administer oaths to witnesses and there shall be a right of examination and
cross-examination of witnesses.
(d) When the matter in controversy is such that the delay incident to
the hearing and decision of the case would create an emergency contrary to
the public interest and there is administrative action or inaction, prior to or
without such hearing and determination, resulting in the destruction of the
property or damage to the aggrieved person involved in such controversy, the
findings of fact and decision when made by the board shall state the amount
of pecuniary damage suffered by the aggrieved person and upon approval
thereof by the head of the agency concerned, the amount of damages so
approved, if acceptable to the aggrieved person, shall be certified to the Congress for an appropriation with which to pay the same.
(e) Where any matter arises out of the activities of any independent
agency (as defined in Section 1 of this Act), it may be provided by rule that
such matter may be heard in the first instance by one of its trial examiners,
who shall file with the independent agency his written findings of fact and
separate decision or order thereon, which shall be made in all instances,
whether by the examiner or the independent agency, after reasonable public
notice and a full and fair hearing as hereinbefore in this Section provided.
A copy or copies thereof shall be sent by registered mail to the aggrieved
party. The independent agency may enter at the expiration of thirty days
(Sundays and national holidays excluded) such appropriate decision or order
as may be proper unless within said thirty days (Sundays and national holidays excluded) the aggrieved party shall file by registered mail with the independent agency his written objections to the findings of fact and decision or
order of the examiner in which event the independent agency shall not enter
Its decision or order without first according a public hearing upon reasonable
notice to such party. Such hearing shall be before the members of the independent agency, if it has not less than three members, or before any three of
such members. If the independent agency has less than three members, an

1939]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BILL

573

intra-agency board shall be constituted in the manner provided in subsection
(a) of this Section, upon which the member or members of such agency may
serve at his or their election.
SECTION 4. Judicial Review of Decisions or Orders of Administrative
Agencies. (a) The term "Circuit Court of Appeals" as hereinafter used shall
include the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
(b) Any party to a proceeding before any agency or independent agency
as provided in Section 3 of this Act who may be aggrieved by the final decision or order of any agency, or independent agency, as the case may be, within thirty days (Sundays and national holidays excluded) after the date of
receipt by registered mail of a copy thereof, may at his election file a written
petition (1) with the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia; or (2) with the clerk of the Circuit Court of Appeals
within whose jurisdiction such aggrieved party resides or maintains his principal place of business or in which the controversy arose, for review of the
decision or order. Before filing a petition such party may within ten days
make a motion to the agency or independent agency concerned for a rehearing tendering a statement of any further showing to be made thereon
which shall constitute a part of the record, and the time for appeal shall run
from the order on such motion If denied or the order made on such rehearing
if a rehearing shall be had. The petition shall state the alleged errors in the
decision or order of the agency or independent agency concerned. The Attorney General of the United States and the agency or independent agency shall
each be served by registered mail with a copy of the petition and it shall be
the duty of the Attorney General of the United States to cause appearance
to be entered on behalf of the United States within thirty days (Sundays and
national holidays excluded) after the date of receipt by him of a copy of the
petition and it shall be the duty of the agency or independent agency, as the
case may be, within thirty days (Sundays and national holidays excluded) or
such longer time as the court may by order direct, after receipt of a copy of
the petition to cause to be prepared and filed with the clerk of such court
the original or a full and accurate transcript of the entire record in such proceeding before such agency or independent agency. The court may affirm or
set aside the decision or order or may direct the agency or independent
agency concerned to modify its decision or order. Any case may be remanded
to the agency or independent agency to take such further evidence as in the
discretion of the court may be required but no objection not urged before the
agency or independent agency, as the case may be, shall be considered by the
court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused by
the court for good cause shown. To facilitate the hearing of such appeals
and avoid delay in the hearing other matters before the court, such court may
constitute special sessions thereof to consist of any three judges competent in
law to sit as judges of a Circuit Court of Appeals, which special sessions
may be held concurrently with the regular sessions of said court. Any decision or order of any agency or independent agency shall be set aside if it is
made to appear (1) that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous, or (2) that
the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (3) that
the decision or order is not supported by the findings of fact, or (4) that the
decision or order was issued without due notice and a reasonable opportunity
having been afforded the aggrieved party for a full and fair hearing, or (5)
that the decision or order is beyond the jurisdiction of the agency or independent agency, as the case may be, or (6) that the decision or order infringes
the Constitution or statutes of the United States, or (7) that the decisions
or order is otherwise contrary to law.
(c) The judgments of the Circuit Courts of Appeal shall be final, except
that they shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United
States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in Sections 239 and
240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C. Tit. 28, Secs. 346 and 347).
(d) Where the cause of action or controversy is otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the United States Court of Claims as provided in Sections 136
to 187, inclusive of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C. Tit. 28, Secs. 241 to
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293, inclusive), the petition provided in this section may be to the said Court
of Claims at the election of the aggrieved party.
(e) Where a Circuit Court of Appeals or the Court of Claims finds itself
in disagreement with a previously rendered decision of another court having
jurisdiction under this section, it shall certify to the Supreme Court of the
United States a distinct and definite statement of the question or proposition
of law upon which such disagreement rests, with a statement of the nature
of the cause and of the facts on which such question or proposition of law
arises together with a statement of the reasons in support of such disagreement. Such further proceedings shall be as provided in Section 239 of the
Judicial Code as amended (U. S. C. Tit. 28, Sec. 346).
SmcToN 5. Jurisdiction of Courts to Impose Damages Where Appeal was
for Delay and for Costs. The Circuit Courts of Appeal or the Court of Claims,
as the case may be, shall have jurisdiction and power to impose damages in
any case where the decision or order of the agency or independent agency. is
affirmed and the court finds that the petition was filed merely for delay. In
all cases the costs on review shall be allowed the prevailing party after final
judgment, to be collected according to law.
SscTzO 6. Exceptions and Reservations. (a) Nothing contained in this
Act shall operate to modify or repeal any rights or procedure as now provided
by law for any person to have his controversy with the United States heard
and determined in any district court or circuit court of appeals of the United
States, but the remedy herein provided shall be an alternate remedy for such
remedy as may be otherwise provided by law.
(b) Nothing contained in this act shall apply to or affect any matter concerning or relating to the conduct of foreign affairs; the conduct of military
or naval operations in time of war or civil insurrection; the trial by courtsmartial of persons otherwise within the jurisdiction of such courts-martial;
the conduct of the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Interstate Commerce Commission; the conduct of the Department of Justice and the offices
of the United States Attorneys, except as otherwise herein specifically provided; or any matter concerning or relating to the internal revenue, customs,
patent, trade-mark, copyright, or Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' laws;
or laws relating to Indian lands; or any case where the aggrieved party was
denied a loan, or may be dissatisfied with a grading service in connection with
the purchase or sale of agricultural products, or has failed to receive appointment or employment by any agency or independent agency. Sections 1 and 2
of this Act shall not apply to the General Accounting Office.

